THE SECOND WALLA
WALLA TREATY COUNCIL
AND THE STEVENS SKIRMISH, SEPTEMBER 11-20, 1856
AND THE STEVENS SKIRMISH, SEPTEMBER 11-20, 1856
The Walla Walla Treaty Council of 1855 was held on the north
bank of Mill Creek east of the intersection of First and Main in what is now
downtown Walla Walla. The Second Walla Walla Treaty Council, held in 1856,
also took place in the vicinity of Mill Creek, but at two different locations.
The location of the 1856 council sites and the ensuing
skirmishing was the subject of a workshop held on February 11, 2006 at Walla
Walla Community College organized by our local citizens group Walla Walla 2020.
The purpose of the workshop was to compare historical accounts, including those
below, to visit likely sites, and to discuss potential commemorative activities
during the sesquicentennial of these events. Participants included historians,
archaeologists, tribal representatives, and interested local residents.
According to historian Alvin Josephy, in seeking to
bring to an end the war that had broken out after the Treaty Council of 1855,
“Stevens regarded possession of the Walla Walla Valley as the key to a
successful campaign against the interior tribes.”[i]
In late July, after he heard of the fight in the Grande Ronde [in which Col.
B.F. Shaw of the Washington territorial militia attacked and decimated a largely
unarmed camp of Indians in the vicinity of Elgin] and Robie’s trouble with the
Nez Perces [who had expelled him as Stevens’ emissary], he decided to go to
Walla Walla and hold another council with the tribes...Whatever his reasons
were, he sent messages to Shaw and Craig to summon all the neutral tribes in
the interior to meet him at the head of the Walla Walla Valley in the middle of
September, and to invite all the hostile bands to attend also, with the
condition that they come unarmed under a guarantee of safe conduct and agree to
end the war and submit to the government.”
“….Stevens left Olympia on August 11 and stopped at Fort
Vancouver, where he asked (U.S. Army Col.) Wright to accompany him to Walla
Walla…Wright told Stevens that he could not make the trip himself but would
order Lieutenant Colonel Steptoe and four companies of regulars to go to the
council, relieve the volunteers, and build a permanent post there….Stevens left
The Dalles on August 19, traveling with a large train of Indian goods in
advance of the column of regulars. He reached Shaw’s men in the valley on
August 23 and a few days later was upset when a band of Indians captured part
of the pack train a few miles from his camp….On August 30 the Indians began to
arrive, and by September 11 the council was ready to begin.”[ii]
All accounts of these events agree that the Second Walla
Walla Treaty Council opened at Shaw’s camp, and later moved further upstream.
According to historian W.D. Lyman, Stevens “reached
Shaw’s camp, two miles above Walla Walla, on the 23rd. On September 5th,
Steptoe reached Walla Walla and established himself at a point four miles below
Shaw’s camp, said by Lewis McMorris to have been at the present garrison.”
[Official military documents establish that Steptoe camped near the Whitman
Mission on Sept. 5, then moved to the location Lyman describes, the site of the
current VA Medical Center, on Sept. 8].
“….Governor Stevens was exceedingly anxious to have perfect
harmony with the regulars and thereby present a united front to the enemy, many
of whom had drawn the conclusion that the regulars and volunteers were entirely
different sets of people. He therefore requested Steptoe to move camp to a
point near his own. On the next morning Steptoe got underway and paused at the
governor’s tent, who supposed of course that he was going to make camp there. He
was dumfounded, as well he may have been, to discover that Steptoe was passing
on from sight up the valley. This was the more startling, for on account of a
report that volunteers below were being attacked, Shaw had gone down leaving
Stevens with but ten men. However, it had now become necessary for Shaw and his
men to leave permanently, and with this in view the governor requested Steptoe
to return to his near vicinity; incredible as it may seem, Steptoe declined to
do so, alleging that General Wool’s orders did not authorize him to make such
arrangements. The governor, though it must have made his hot blood boil, had to
retain a detachment of sixty-nine men and left Steptoe to his own devices, at a
camp which was on the island on the present Gilkerson place.”
“….And now opens The Second Great Walla Walla Council. Space
does not permit us to give the details of this remarkable meeting, fully as
remarkable as the one of the year before. The Nez Perces were in large force at
first, and the faction under Lawyer was fully committed to the support of the
whites. But a large number of Nez Perces, led by Looking Glass, Speaking Owl,
Joseph, Red Wolf, and Eagle-from-the-Light, were plainly on the verge of
outbreak. Kamiakin, the redoubtable chief of the Yakimas, was coming out with a
strong force. The scowling Cayuses and the brawny Umatillas came whooping,
yelling and firing the prairie grass. Murder was in the air. Governor Stevens
sent an urgent request to Steptoe to come to the council with at least one
company. Steptoe returned an answer to the effect that if the Indians were
really meditating an outbreak he had not enough force to defend both camps, and
therefore he deemed it necessary for Stevens to move to him, instead of he to
Stevens. The heart of the fiery governor was almost broken at this humiliation,
but he had to yield to necessity, and he adjourned the council to Steptoe’s
camp.”[iii]
According to Andrew Pambrun, a member of Stevens’
party, “I received a message from Governor I.I. Stevens requesting me to join
him at the Dalles, to serve as Secretary, Interpreter and guide….We reached
Walla Walla, where Col. Shaw and sixty volunteers were stationed… Col. Shaw had...made
raid into Grande Ronde and killed a good many Indians. According to Indian
statement these were principally old infirm men and squaws….Our camp being
situated among brush and the conduct of the Indians not being as amicable as we
would desire, we concluded to move nearer to Col. Steptoe, who was camped some
distance above on Mill Creek….Camp once established by the way was a poor one,
as in short time the Indians took possession of the brush and water in our
immediate vicinity, and we were at their mercy…”[iv]
According to Matthew P. Burns, a surgeon with the 2nd
Regiment, Washington Territorial Volunteers, writing from Camp Mill Creek on
September 23, 1856, “On the morning of the 14th we had to move our camp and
Gov. Stevens’ Council from Fort Mason to Col. Steptoe’s camp on Mill Creek,
distant four miles, for greater security from the combined Indians, who were
hostile and determined to fight.”[v]
Governor Stevens, in a letter of August 25, 1856 to
Steptoe, said, “We are on a little tributary of Mill Creek, and about one mile
from it.” In Stevens’ letter of October 22, 1856 referred to by F.T. Gilbert in
his Historic Sketches of Walla Walla (1882), Stevens states, “Lieutenant
Steptoe’s force was encamped in the valley on the fifth of September, some five
miles below the council ground…On the evening of the tenth…I made a requisition
upon Lieutenant Colonel Steptoe for two companies of his troops and his
mountain howitzers, and to my surprise, learned from his answer that he had
moved his camp to a point on Mill Creek some seven or eight miles above my
camp, and that his orders from General Wool did not allow him to comply with my
requisition….and at his suggestion, I moved my party…to the vicinity of his
camp.”
The Standard Atlas of 1909 shows the land of the
Gilkersons, referred to by Lyman as the site of Steptoe's Mill Creek camp, to
lie just east of the present Five Mile Road, from which it extends up the Mill
Creek canyon to Seven Mile Road.[vi]
Stevens gave this account of his departure for
the Dalles following the failure of the council:
“In the afternoon [September 18] Lieutenant Colonel
Steptoe…appointed the next day, a little after noon, for a special conference. The
Indians did not, however, come to see Steptoe at the time appointed. They
previously set fire to his grass, and following me as I set out about eleven
o’clock on my way to the Dalles, they attacked me within three miles of
Steptoe’s camp at about one o’clock in the afternoon.”
“So satisfied was I that the Indians would carry into effect
their avowed determination in the councils in their own camps for several
nights previously to attack me, that, in starting I formed my whole party and
moved in order of battle. I moved on under fire one mile to water, when forming
a corral of the wagons and holding the adjacent hills and the brush on the
stream by pickets, I made my arrangements to defend my position and fight the
Indians. Our position in a low open basin, 500 or 600 yards across, was good,
and with the aid of our corral, we could defend ourselves against a vastly
superior force of the enemy.”
“The fight continued till late in the night. Two charges
were made to disperse the Indians, the last led by Lieutenant Colonel Shaw in
person with twenty-four men…Just before the charge the friendly Nez Perces,
fifty in number, who had been assigned to hold the ridge on the south side of
the corral, were told by the enemy, they came not to fight the Nez Perces, but
the whites. ‘Go to your camp,’ said they, ‘or we will wipe it out!’ Their camp,
with their women and children, was on a stream about a mile distant; and I
directed them to retire as I did not require their assistance…”
During the night, Stevens sent a request for help from
Steptoe, who dispatched an escort, and the Stevens party was able to return to
Steptoe’s camp.
According to Stevens, “They reached my camp about two
o’clock in the morning…The howitzer having been fired on the way out, it was
believed nothing would be gained by waiting till morning, and the whole force
immediately returned to Lieutenant Colonel Steptoe’s camp.”
“Soon after sunrise, the enemy attacked the camp, but were
dislodged by the howitzer and a charge by a detachment from Steptoe’s command. On
my arrival at the camp, I urged Lieutenant Colonel Steptoe to build a
blockhouse immediately; to leave one company to defend it with all his
supplies, and by a vigorous winter campaign to whip the Indians into
submission. I placed at his disposal for the building, my teams and Indian
employes. The blockhouse and stockade were built in a little more than two
days. My Indian storeroom was re-built at one corner of the stockade.”
“…On the twenty-third September, we started for the Dalles,
which we reached on the second of October. Nothing of interest occurred on the
road.”[vii]
THE LOCATION OF KEY EVENTS DURING THE SECOND WALLA WALLA
TREATY COUNCIL AND SKIRMISH
Site where the Council opened
Stevens and his party arrived on August 23, 1856, and
established the council grounds at the camp of Col. B.F. Shaw of the Washington
Territorial Volunteers, who had been in the Walla Walla valley since early
July. According to Stevens’ letter of August 25, 1856 to Lieut. Col. Edward.F.
Steptoe who was in charge of federal troops assigned to the area, “We are on a
little tributary of Mill Creek, and about one mile from it.”
This initial camp, called Fort Mason, was placed by
historian W.D. Lyman and others as being two miles above the grounds of the
1855 council, which had been held east of where Mill Creek crosses the present
intersection of Main and First streets in downtown Walla Walla. The only
significant branches of Mill Creek in that vicinity are Yellowhawk Creek, about
a mile south of Mill Creek, and Garrison Creek, about a half mile south of Mill
Creek.
To satisfy these descriptions, the most likely location for
the initial grounds of the Second Walla Walla Treaty Council is between the
present School Avenue and Berney Drive, near the Yellowhawk Creek crossings, in
the vicinity of Leonetti Cellar winery.
Site where the Council ended
On September 14, because of hostility on the part of the
majority of the Indians present, Stevens moved the council to a site several
miles up Mill Creek where hundreds of federal troops were camped under the
command of Lt. Col. Steptoe. Steptoe had reached the valley on Sept. 5 and had
camped near the site of the Whitman Mission, before moving four miles east on
the 8th to what is now the Veterans Administration Medical Center. Then on
Sept. 10 he moved “up the valley some 5 or six miles beyond the Governor,”
according to Steptoe’s letter of Nov. 20, 1856 to Col. George Wright. Other
accounts of the location of this upper camp are also given, including “some
seven or eight miles above you” in Steptoe’s letter to Stevens of Sept. 10, and
“five miles below Whitman’s old mill site…directly on the trails from the Nez
Perces, Spokanes, and Palouse Country,” in Steptoe’s letter to Wright of Sept.
10-11. Other contemporaneous sources describe Steptoe's camp as being
from 4-8 miles above Shaw’s camp where the treaty council began.
Historian W.D. Lyman refers in 1901 to Steptoe’s location as
being “at a camp which was on the island on the present Gilkerson Place.” The
1905 Standard Atlas shows Gilkerson family property extending from Five-Mile
Road to just above Seven-Mile Road. On September 14, according to Stevens’ Oct.
22 letter to Commissioner of Indian Affairs George Maypenny, he moved the
Council to within a quarter mile of Steptoe, meeting Kamiakin on the way, who
reestablished his camp with other Indians a quarter mile from Stevens,
separated only by Mill Creek and its wooded bottom.
The precise location of these council grounds has not been
determined, but the descriptions would put it in the Mill Creek canyon,
probably just below the current Seven-Mile Road on the island created by Titus
and Mill Creeks. This island is shown on the first official survey map of the
area begun in 1860 and completed in 1861, and is between 5 and 6 miles by trail
from the probable initial council site on Yellowhawk Creek.
Site of the Stevens Skirmish of September 19-20, 1856
The council continued at the upper Mill Creek site until
September 17, when it ended in failure. The Indian position can be summed up in
the words of Speaking Owl, a Nez Perce chief close to Looking Glass: “Will you
give us back our lands? That is what we all want to hear about; that is what
troubles us. I ask plainly to have a plain answer.” The unsuccessful result and
the reason for it are made clear in the governor’s report:
At the conclusion of this council, in a brief address to the
Indians, I expressed my regrets that I had failed in my mission—that no one had
said “yes” to my propositions, and that I now had only to say, “follow your own
hearts; those who wish to go to war, go….My propositions were unconditional
submission…
On September 19, Stevens prepared to leave for The Dalles
with his party of 38 wagons pulled by 80 oxen, 50 teamsters and quartermaster’s
men, 69 Washington Volunteers, over 50 friendly Nez Perces, and more than 200
head of loose livestock.
In his Oct. 22 report to the Secretary of War, Stevens
states, “Following me as I set out about eleven o’clock on the way to the
Dalles, they attacked me within three miles of Steptoe’s camp at about one
o’clock in the afternoon…I moved on under fire one mile to water, when forming
a corral of the wagons and holding the adjacent hills and the brush on the
stream by pickets, I made my arrangements to defend my position and fight the
Indians. Our position in a low, open basin, 500 or 600 yards across, was good,
and with the aid of our corral, we could defend ourselves against a vastly
superior force of the enemy….The friendly Nez Perces, fifty in number, who had
been assigned to hold the ridge on the south side of the corral, were told by
the enemy, they came not to fight the Nez Perces, but the whites. ‘Go to your
camp,’ said they, ‘or we will wipe it out!’ Their camp, with their women and
children, was on a stream about a mile distant; and I directed them to retire
as I did not require their assistance…”
In his letter of October 22 to Commissioner Maypenny,
Stevens describe the events as follows: “On crossing the stream the whole force
was drawn up in order of battle for little doubt was entertained that the
Indians were determined to attack us. After moving 2½ miles, we crossed a stream,
the Indians following us and sounding the war whoop. Though urged to encamp
here, I determined to move on till actually attacked and then to make such
arrangements as circumstances should demand. The whole party was scarcely over
the stream when the attack was commenced by the Indians firing into our rears.”
This is consistent with Stevens’ written communiqué to
Steptoe during the extended skirmish, stating, “Dear Sir: My party was attacked
by the Indians about two and a half miles from your camp. I am now halted on a
little stream some three and a half miles from you.”
An account by one of the participants published in the
Oregon Statesman on October 14, 1856 states, “small parties of Indians began to
pass us on the left, and soon commenced firing on our rear…But we drove on, the
volunteers, and occasionally a teamster, returning the fire, until we had
reached a small spring branch, where we corralled our wagons, including our
stock. A place where three small valleys met, and as many elevations of about
30 feet, standing close in the form of a triangle…By the time we were camped,
we were surrounded and fired upon from all sides. The three points having first
been secured to keep the enemy from annoying the train, a charge was made upon
the Indians in our rear to the left.”
Col. B.F. Shaw, in charge of the Volunteers, gave a
description of the skirmish scene that was published in the Oregon Democrat on
October 31, 1856:
On the 19th the train and escort moved at 11 a.m…in the
following order:--Gov. Stevens and Indian officers, together with the advance
guard… the wagon train and loose stock in the center; Capt.Goff, Lieuts. Hunter
and Wait, with the balance of the command, composed the rear guard. After
proceeding in this manner, two and a half miles, and coming into the valley of
a small branch of Mill Creek, the whole body of Indians came on the full run
for the rear of the train, and opened a fire on the rear guard which was
returned in good order…The Train moved on slowly one mile further, when the
wagons were formed into a corral, and the loose animals run in for security.
Pickets were then placed on the highest hills, so as to prevent the Indians
from firing into the corral and stampeding the animals….Late in the evening, I
took all the available force…and charged a body of Indians on a hill some 500
yards south of the camp.
Location of the Skirmish site
From the upper end of that portion of the Mill Creek canyon
lying between Five-Mile and Seven-Mile roads, “the valley of a small branch of
Mill Creek” enters the canyon about 2 1/2 miles downstream. Within a mile of
that point, easily accessible by wagons, is a low, open basin about 500-600
yards across, with a small spring branch, where three small valleys meet,
standing in the form of a triangle, with adjacent low ridges of about 30 feet
elevation, a ridge to the south about 500 yards away, and another stream about
a mile away to the south.
After walking and viewing all of the terrain within a couple
miles of the Mill Creek canyon, I found this to be the only site that meets the
accounts of the various participants. I have set out below fifteen points
of skirmish activity noted by the participants in these events, with suggested
locations for each. Additional corroboration for these conclusions is
provided by the first survey work of the area completed in 1860 and the
resulting 1861 survey map, which show a road from the vicinity where the
council apparently ended leading to the valley of the small branch of Mill
Creek mentioned above, as well as a road passing through the apparent skirmish
site leading southwest into the valley of Russell Creek not far from the
vicinity of the initial council site. To provide further potential evidence of
the skirmish site, additional archeological work should be undertaken.
Serious fighting took place throughout the afternoon of
September 19, including two charges by the Volunteers with loss of life on both
sides, and continued until 2 a.m. on Sept. 20 when the Stevens party was
rescued by Steptoe’s troops and escorted back to camp.
On the way back to the upper council site and at
Steptoe’s camp that morning, additional fighting occurred. According to
Stevens’ Oct. 22 report, “Soon after sunrise, the enemy attacked the camp, but
were soon disbursed by the howitzer and a charge by a detachment from Steptoe’s
command." Steptoe, in his Sept. 20 letter to Col. Wright, said, “Soon
after day-break, the Indians established themselves on the heights around, and
beyond the reach of shot, and soon got into the brush and fired into the camp,
but without doing any harm. A shell and a few riflemen disbursed them at once.”
Further details are given by Andrew Dominique Pambrun, who
was Stevens’ secretary, guide, and interpreter at the council and
who writes a colorful account in his autobiography, Sixty Years on the
Frontier in the Pacific Northwest, quoted in part below. As indicated
above, the precise site of Steptoe’s camp has still not been identified.
Site of the First Military Fort Walla Walla
On Sept. 19, the Indians continued burning the grass around
Steptoe’s camp, which they had begun while the council was in session. As
Steptoe was left with no grazing for his horses, his men began looking for a
new camp near fresh grass according to historian Kent Richards in his biography
of Stevens. In his October 22 report Stevens writes, “On my arrival
at the camp, I urged Lt. Col. Steptoe to build a blockhouse immediately—to
leave one company to defend it with all his supplies…I placed at his disposal
for the building, my teams and Indian employees.
The blockhouse and stockade were built in a little more than
two days. My Indian store room was re-built at one corner of the stockade. On
the 23d Sept., we started for the Dalles, which we reached on the 2d October.
Nothing of interest occurred on the road.”
In an interview conducted by local researcher Steve
Plucker, long-time area resident Lawrence Davis recalled seeing an old log
building about 12' x 12' with gun ports in the walls, located in the barnyard
of the current Leon Filan place in the Mill Creek canyon just east of Five Mile
Road. Leon Filan relates that as a boy in the 1940’s he remembers such a
building to the north of his family’s buildings in the vicinity of Mill Creek,
as well as a long ledge on the canyon wall southeast of the family home that he
was told had been built by the US Army to guard against Indian attacks, though
little if any evidence of it exists today.
Although historical accounts appear to place the council
grounds and Steptoe’s camp further east than the Filan site, it is quite
possible after grass was burned at that camp that what is now the
Filan site was chosen as the location for the blockhouse, storehouse, and
stockade that was to become the first military Fort Walla Walla as the site of
these buildings was officially designated by Assistant Adjutant General W.W.
Mackall on October 1, 1856. It is also possible that the log structure
described was later moved to the Filan property from its original location
at the Fort.
SPECIFIC SKIRMISH POINTS
Fifteen points of activity were described by
participants in the September 19-20, 1856 attack by American Indians on the
party of Governor Isaac I. Stevens in the vicinity of Mill Creek in the Walla
Walla Valley. These points and accounts are detailed below and noted on the
accompanying contour map.
1. The point where the Stevens party crossed a stream not
more than three miles of leaving Steptoe’s camp and was first attacked.
“After proceeding…two and a half miles, and coming into the valley of a small
branch of Mill Creek, the whole body of Indians came on the full run for the
rear of the train, and opened fire on the rear guard which was returned in good
order”—Col B.F. Shaw. This was confirmed in Gov. Stevens’ letter of October 22,
1856 to Secretary of War Jefferson Davis: “They attacked me within three miles
of Steptoe’s camp at about one o’clock in the afternoon,” as well as in
Stevens’ letter of the same date to Commissioner of Indian Affairs George
Maypenny: “After moving two and a half miles, we crossed a stream, the Indians
following us and sounding the war whoop…The whole party was scarcely over the
stream when the attack was commenced by the Indians firing into our rears.”
This is also confirmed in the account of Expressman John Penn in his report of
October 10, 1856: “At the distance of three miles from the council ground, they
charged down and commenced an attack on the rear of the train by firing a
volley into the rear guard,” as well as by Stevens’ secretary, guide, and
interpreter Andrew Pambrun: “We had gone but a few miles, when George, an Old
Nez Perce came up to me and told me that the Hostiles were coming to attack us.
On looking in the direction he pointed, I saw them coming in squads of from
thirty to fifty coming down the hills.”
2. The course of the train from the initial point of
attack to where a corral was formed. “I moved on under fire one mile to
water”—Gov. Stevens to Jefferson Davis. Also confirmed by the Oct. 14, 1856
report in the Oregon Statesman: “But we drove on, the volunteers and
occasionally a teamster returning the fire, until we had reached a small spring
branch.” According to Col. Shaw: “The train moved on slowly one mile further.”
Expressman Penn: “The train moved on one mile further and halted at a small
spring brook.” Andrew Pambrun: “I immediately rode up to the Governor, who was
some distance in advance and informing him of the coming hostilities. He at
once ordered a halt, but I objected there was going to be some hot work, and if
there were wounded, they must have water, that I knew of a small spring creek,
which I thought we could reach before we were surrounded. All right lead the
way, said he; I did so.”
3. The place where the wagons halted and a corral was
formed. Stevens in his letter to Davis: “Forming a corral of the wagons,
and holding the adjacent hills and the brush on the stream by pickets, I made
my arrangements to defend my position and fight the Indians. Our position in a low,
open basin some five hundred or six hundred yards across was good, and with the
aid of our corral we could defend ourselves against a vastly superior force of
the enemy.” Shaw: “The wagons were formed into a corral, and the loose animals
run in for security. Pickets were then placed on the highest hills, so as to
prevent the Indians from firing into the corral and stampeding the animals.”
Penn: “The wagons as they came up formed a corrall in which the teams and loose
stock were secured, without the loss of a single head, athough the Indians kept
up a heavy fire and made every effort to stampede the animals.” Pambrun: “Just
as we finished making a pen, with the wagons chained together and the animals
secured therein, we were surrounded.” The Oregon Statesman: “We had reached a
small spring branch, where we corralled our wagons, including our stock. A
place where three small valleys met, and as many elevations of about 30 feet,
standing close in the form of a triangle.”
4. The site of the first Volunteer charge, led by Lt.
Hunter. Col Shaw: “After firing at them for some time from the picket
points, Lieut. Hunter was ordered to take twenty men and charge a body of sixty
or seventy Indians from a point of brush. The Indians reinforced; and Lieut.
Hunter prudently fell back and took position on a hill east of the corral.” The
Oregon Statesman: “By the time we were camped, we were surrounded and fired
upon from all sides. The three points having first been secured…a charge by Lt.
Wilks and about 20 men was made upon the Indians in our rear to the left.”
5. The east hill where Lt. Hunter retreated after the
first charge, and pickets were established by the Volunteers. Col. Shaw:
“Pickets were then placed on the highest hills, so as to prevent the Indians
from firing into the corral and stampeding the animals….Lieut. Hunter prudently
fell back and took position on a hill east of the corral.”
6. A second hill where pickets were established by
Volunteers to protect the corral. Gov. Stevens: “Holding the adjacent hills
and the brush on the stream by pickets, I made my arrangements to defend my
position...” Col. Shaw: “Pickets were then placed on the highest hills, so as
to prevent the Indians from firing into the corral and stampeding the animals.”
7. The area where Volunteer pickets were placed in the
brush. Surgeon Matthew Burns: “Col. Craig and Messrs. Dotty and Pambrun did
good service in checking the Indians in their attempt to come into camp; they
stationed themselves in the brush on picket guard.” Gov. Stevens: “Holding the
adjacent hills and the brush on the stream by pickets, I made my arrangements
to defend my position...” Pambrun: “About seventy-five yards from the wagons,
was a thicket of willow and rose bushes, which the Governor wished to hold
against the Indians and consulted Craig, Higgins (Wagon Master), and P.
Whitman, nephew of Doctor Whitman, and others; Col Shaw was entirely ignored in
the council….The object of the council was to learn, as to who was the most
reliable person to be entrusted with the responsibility of holding the point,
and I was unanimously pointed to. When the Governor sent for me and informed me
of the decision inquiring at the same time, if I would go and how many I needed
to hold it, I answered certainly I’ll go and I think six or seven good men will
do.”
8. The hill where the second Volunteer charge took place.
Col. Shaw: “The firing was kept up by the picket in this manner, until late
in the evening, when I took all the available force, consisting of Capt. Goff,
Lieuts. Hunter and Wait, and twenty-three men, and charged a body of Indians on
a hill some 500 yards south of the camp. The object of this was to see how many
of the spectators who were congregated in large numbers on the left, were
fighting men. The whole party advanced at the top of their horses speed, and on
ascending the hill, the whole body of Indians fired a volley; the balls
fortunately passed over our heads. We fired a volley when close to them, which
made them give back some distance. By this time, the body of supposed
spectators came down on the full run, and cut us completely off from camp. I
then ordered the command to turn and charge through them to camp; for a moment
it seemed doubtful whether we could force our way through them or not; the most
of the men having revolvers, made good use of them, unhorsing several Indians
as we passed through, which made them give way on both sides. On seeing this,
the large party which we first charged, came down on the full run, waving their
guns and hatchets…They were however soon checked by a wall of well-directed
fire from a picket in the brush, after this the whole body retired some
distance, and did not make their appearance in any place near us.”
Gov. Stevens: “The fight continued till late in the night.
Two charges were made to disperse the Indians, the last by Lieut. Col. Shaw in
person, with twenty-four men, but, whilst driving before him some one hundred
and fifty Indians, an equal number pushed into his rear, and he was compelled
to cut his way through them towards camp, when, drawing up his men, and, aided
by the teamsters and pickets, who gallantly sprang forward, he drove the
Indians back in full charge upon the corral.”
The Oregon Statesman: “About 4 o’clock the Indians gathered
ahead of us in considerable numbers, and were (the Nez Perces said) preparing
to make a charge upon us, when Captain Goff, with 30 of his men, made a charge
upon them…The Indians outnumbered them 10 to 1, and charged the boys on all
sides, and quite a number charged between them and camp, the guns keeping up a
continual roar…After a few minutes the volunteers came over the hill, and one
in advance cried out, ‘They are killing all the boys,’ when the command was
halted, a charge made, and the enemy were driven from every position.”
Pambrun: “Col. Shaw seeing a large band clustered together,
determined to make a charge and called for thirty volunteers, but the Indians
anticipated him and made a trap; according to the plans, those exposed when
charged should run while those hid in a ravine should cut off his retreat. They
were sure of his destruction for there were in all about three hundred
warriors, that is ten to one. As understood, as soon as Col. Shaw made the
charge those in sight ran. But providentially an old Indian who was ignorant of
the plans met them and cried ”You band of squaws, what are you running from a
few white men for, turn on them and kill them all.” They obeyed and saved them.
Those in the ravine joined the others in the counter charge, and the confusion
and noise that ensued were alarming. Boys, I said to my men, Shaw and his men I
am afraid are taken, let us charge, and I ran to within twenty-five yards…”
9. Where Indian spectators were located to the left of
the south hill. Col. Shaw: “I…charged a body of Indians on a hill some 500
yards south of the camp. The object of this was to see how many of the
spectators who were congregated in large numbers on the left, were fighting
men…. (After the main body retreated) the body of supposed spectators came down
on the full run, and cut us completely off from camp.” This may also have been
the hill the friendly Nez Perce were assigned to hold, rather than the larger
hill southwest of it where the second charge took place. Gov. Stevens to Davis:
“Just before the charge, the friendly Nez Perces, fifty in number, who had been
assigned to holding the ridge on the south side of the corral, were told by the
enemy, ‘they came not to fight the Nez Perces, but the whites, go to your camp,
or we wipe it out.’ Their camp with the women and children, was on a stream
about a mile distant—upon which I directed the Nez Perces to retire, as I did
not require their assistance, and I was fearful that my men might not be able
to distinguish them from the hostiles, and thus friendly Indians might be
killed.” Surgeon Burns: “As there was great danger of our men shooting the
friendly Indians, Gov. Stevens told them to stop on a small hill about one
hundred yards from our corral.”
10. The area where Elijah Hill, Co. K, was killed. Surgeon
Burns: “So closely did the Indians charge into the camp, that Elijah Hill, Co.
K, was mortally wounded, the ball entering his abdomen. I extracted the ball on
the spot, but he died on the third day after great suffering.” Andrew Pambrun:
“In the midst of confusion and noise, there was a sudden lull and I could not
conjecture what the cause could be, till I heard the report of a gun, followed
by loud Indian yells. It appears that a white man and an Indian simultaneously
observed each other, enter a deep washout, and made for each other, but the
Indian after running a short distance stopped and quietly waited for his
adversary, who came rushing up without care or caution and of course was shot,
and he died in great agony, being shot through the bowels.” A portion of this
“deep washout” appears to have been the ravine where the Indians hid to cut off
Shaw during the charge in #9, as described by Pambrun.
11. The area where Sgt. C. Riggs, Co. K, was gravely wounded.
The Oregon Statesman: “Silas Riggs, of Co. K, mounted the point of a hill,
and fought manfully with some Indians who had taken shelter of the hill,
discharged his gun and revolver, turned under cover of the hill, reloaded, went
up again, discharged his gun and turned back, when a shot passed through his
right pocket and carried away his ramrod. He stopped to pick it up, when a ball
struck him in the back. He staggered and fell, then the scalp-shout was raised
by about a dozen Indians, and as they made a rush for him, our boys went to the
rescue, and he was brought back into camp, and is still living, 7 days after.”
Pambrun: “Some time elapsed before there was anything going on in our part of
the field, and one of my young men became restless, and in spite of all I could
say, to prevent him, went on a rising piece of ground and perceiving an Indian
behind some sage bushes, emptied his rifle and two revolvers without effect.
The Indian returned the fire, knocking the ramrod from his hand and stooping to
pick it up, was shot in the back. I sent two men to bring him and take him to
the wagons.”
12. The hill where Volunteer rifle pits were dug in,
abandoned, then retaken. Gov. Stevens: “(Prior to the arrival of Steptoe’s
troops about two o’clock in the morning) a picket had been driven in an hour
and a half before by the enemy, that on the hill south of the corral, but the
enemy was immediately dislodged, and all the points were held, and ground pits
being dug.” The Oregon Statesman: “About 12 o’clock at night, the Indians drove
in the guard from one of those points that commanded the camp, and for a while
showered the balls in tolerably freely. Some consternation prevailed in camp…It
was immediately proposed to send a party of 10 men to retake the point, but it
was almost impossible to get men to go and take it from them. It was, however,
at length made up. Lt. Wilks and 10 men retook the point and the firing ceased
for a while.” Andrew Pambrun: “This was the most critical time; the pickets
could not stand the constant fire and whiz of bullets over their heads; they
were in pits, and were therefore perfectly safe, but they abandoned them and
rushed for camp; hearing the trampling and supposing to be that of Indians
charging, I told the men with me, to lie flat on the ground and not to shoot
until I have the word; all did as I directed, but an old teamster, who shot at
the coming fugitives taking a finger off of one, who lustily cried don’t shoot,
it’s us. It was a fortunate occurance, as no doubt, we would have killed every
one. The trouble now was, to get out more pickets; Shaw in vain tried, for as
fast as he got one or two, they would hide, while he was after others; he was
perfectly discouraged, when I went to and reported the matter to the Governor.
He immediately went to about the center of the enclosure, and addressed the men
in the strongest terms, not exactly in genteel English, called them out by
name, when he got all he required. He ordered each to his post, warning them at
the same time, that nonfulfillment of orders would be instant death. This put
an end to all further trouble or disorder.”
13. The area where Steptoe’s troops fired the howitzer as
they approached the corral. The Oregon Statesman: “Presently, a shot from a
howitzer, a mile distant, told that the regulars were coming to our
assistance.” Gov. Stevens: “Lt. Col. Steptoe sent to my camp Lt. Davidson, with
detachments from the companies of dragoons and artillery with a mountain
howitzer. They reached my camp about two o’clock in the morning.” Surgeon
Burns: “When the command was within a half a mile of our camp, they had to
cross a small branch; Lieut. D. heard the Indians speaking in the brush. He put
the howitzer in position and raked the brush, making the Indians run in all
directions.” Andrew Pambrun: “Between one and two o’clock the soldiers made
their appearance, and sent a shell to where the Indians were playing on a fife
and drum, which silenced both.”
14. The course of the train during its return from the
corral to Steptoe’s camp. Lt. Col. Steptoe, in his Sept. 20, 1856
letter to Col. Wright reported: “Lt. Davidson was assailed by the enemy along
the way back, but he drove them promptly from their positions without
sustaining any loss...and the whole party returned about four o’clock in the
morning.” The Oregon Statesman: “We were soon hitched up and on our way back to
Steptoe’s camp, which we made at day-break, after a running fight all the way
without loss on our part. The Indians suffered some, as a horse came back into
camp from them, bearing finger marks of blood.” Expressman Penn: “The train
encamped near Col. Steptoe’s at day-light, without loss in returning though the
Indians fired into it several times.” Surgeon Burns: “The command reached our
camp about 2 o’clock in the morning, when Gov. Stevens and both the volunteer
and regular forces returned to Col. Steptoe’s camp, the Indians firing at us
continually from the right side all the way.”
Andrew Pambrun: “There was now a general stir, yoking and
hitching ox teams, saddling horses, etc., while the Volunteers took one station
and the Soldiers another, till we were on our way to the Soldiers encampment.
The Soldiers then took the advance and the Volunteers were to take the rear;
what became of the latter I do not know for I found myself, with the team in
the rear, without a single guard. I had to ride the leading team, and wait till
the last came up and so on through the whole way. On one round I found the last
team detached... I accompanied (the driver) to get the wagon. I told him to
drive as fast as his oxen would travel, till we overtook the train but an
Indian or two annoyed us very much constantly shooting at us. So I told him to
halt, get behind his wagon and hold my horse…I went but a short distance and
sat down and waited…, at the third flash of his gun I fired. The
teamster…cried, you have got him, I heard him fall, and he ran in that
direction, when he met a white pony, with neck and shoulders covered with
blood. He caught him and hitched him to his wagon…I told him…drive up as fast
as he could and overtake the train, which we soon did as they had halted, to
find out the cause of my absence so long. All this time the Indians kept an
incessant fire, but doing no damage…We finally came to a halt near a small
branch of Mill Creek, and waited fully half an hour while the soldiers were
scouring the timber of lurking Indians. The moon now shone enough to expose our
position and the enemy having taken position on the brow of the hill, poured
volley after volley, without harm to the defenseless teamsters. I stood on the
hill side, to see that none left his team, the greatest danger being the
stampeding of our teams, for nothing will top a frightened ox. I heard an
Indian yell distinctly, shoot that man beyond the wagons, and the bullets fell
around me raising quite a dust, a second volley followed and closer to the
mark. My horse snorted and jumped several times, so near did the bullets come
to his head, and one came close enough to me to tear off a button hole from my
vest….The teamsters were much concerned about me, and called to me to come
away, and about this time the soldiers returned, and we resumed our march to
camp.”
15. Steptoe’s camp further up the Mill Creek Valley where
the final skirmishes occurred on Sept.
20. Gov. Stevens to Jefferson Davis: “Soon after
sunrise, the enemy attacked the camp, but were soon dislodged by the howitzer
and a charge by a detachment from Steptoe’s command.” Col. Steptoe to Col.
Wright: “Soon after day-break, the Indians established themselves on the
heights around, and beyond the reach of shot, and soon got into the bush and
fired into the camp, but without doing any harm. A shell and a few riflemen
dispersed them at once. They were all mounted and…I knew it would be worse than
idle to pursue them.” The Oregon Statesman: “In the morning the Indians took
the brush above the regulars’ camp and fired a few shots at them, some of the
balls passing through their tents, but the shanghais and a bomb soon took
possession of the brush, leaving blood and hair to mark the spot where the bomb
burst, still a few shots were fired till noon.” Col Shaw: “The Indians attacked
Col. Steptoe’s camp from a point of woods nearby, but a shell from the howitzer
dislodged them, and the infantry took possession. Strong picket guards of both
the regulars and volunteers kept the Indians out of gun shot.” Burns: “When
daylight came, the hostiles could be seen on all the hills around, and some
more bold than the rest, set fire to what little grass remained around Col.
Steptoe’s camp…Our cattle and horses are starving.”
Andrew Pambrun: “I had hardly gone to sleep when the
officers sent for me then being broad day, and stated that the Indians had
fired on the guard and herders…While talking and taking some artificial
courage, several bullets pierced the tent and passed close by our heads…Col.
Steptoe ordered a few shells to be thrown into the timber, which was
effectually cleared of Indians, who had a great dread of the fire balls, as
they called them. Seven soldiers followed me and stayed. We took a position
under a small bluff and the Indians being dislodged from the timber now
collected en masse on our front….The Minnie rifle then used by the Army, was a
fine arm, shooting with accuracy at long range, and with such tremendous force.
The Soldiers reported thirty were killed, though I would not vouch for the
correctness of this statement….The Indians now left the valley…”
Daniel N. Clark, 9-4-06
[i]
Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., The Nez Perce Indians and the Opening of the
Northwest, 1997, Mariner Books, p. 337
[ii]
Ibid, pp 372-73
[iii]
W.D. Lyman, An Illustrated History of Walla Walla County, W.H. Lever,
1901, p. 82.
[iv]
Andrew Dominique Pambrun, Sixty Years on the Frontier in the Pacific
Northwest, 1978, Ye Galleon Press, pp 101-102, 105
[v]
The Oregonian, _____________, 1856.
[vi]
George A. Ogle Standard Atlas of Walla Walla County, Chicago, 1909
[vii]
Isaac I. Stevens, letter of October 22, 1856, to Jefferson Davis, Secretary of
War
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